Court of Appeals of Virginia Enforces “Ryder” Easement Based on its Reference in the Deeds for the Lots Adjoining the Private Road
On Monday, the Court of Appeals of Virginia issued a significant decision about private road easements often referred to as “Ryder” easements. In Becker Building Company, LLC, et al. v. Scott W. Keller, et al., the Court upheld a private right of easement like the one espoused in Ryder v. Petrea. 243 Va. 421 (1992). The Court held that where lots are organized with respect to a private road, and a plat showing the road is recorded, all lots sold and conveyed with reference to the private road carry the right to the use of the private easement.
In 1976, the Rhodes subdivided their parcel of land, sold ten acres of the southernmost acreage to Cowne, and granted an express easement of 50 feet for ingress and egress over their remaining parcel to allow access to Route 50. In 1982, the Rhodes subdivided their remaining parcel and conveyed a ten-acre portion to their son and daughter-in-law, also granting an express easement for access to Route 50. Both express easements were depicted on a plat incorporated into and recorded with the corresponding deeds. (See Figures in the attached Opinion.)
Emberger owned a neighboring parcel on the east side of the express easements. In 2004, Emberger acquired the remaining portion of the original Rhodes parcel fronting on Route 50. In 2007, Emberger created a small subdivision which contained parts of the original Rhodes parcel. Emberger granted the county an express “private street easement” for “public emergency and maintenance,” which coincided with the express easements originally created by the Rhodeses (the “Private Road”). In 2009, Emberger conveyed another former Rhodes parcel on the west side of the Private Road. The deed provided it was “subject to easements, utility restrictions, and right-of-way of record” and included a survey depicting the Private Road. Between 2016 and 2017, Easton & Porter Group, LLC (“Easton”) acquired all parcels originally belonging to the Rhodes, excluding the Cowne parcel, meaning all parcels to the east and west of the Private Road.
Following another series of conveyances, the Kellers owned the front parcel to the west of the Private Road, adjoining Route 50, Becker owned three parcels, one directly south of the Kellers’ parcel and two to the east of the Private Road. Diamond Back Investments owned the parcel surrounding Becker’s parcels to the east of the Private Road, which adjoins Route 50.[1] The Kellers’ deed stated the conveyance was “subject to easements” including the “private street easement.”
The Kellers brought a declaratory judgment action against Becker asserting any easements established for the benefit of their eastern parcels were extinguished by the doctrine of merger when Easton acquired simultaneous ownership of the parcels adjoining the Private Road. The Circuit Court of Fauquier County granted the Kellers’ motion for partial summary judgment, holding any easement over the Private Road was extinguished when Easton acquired title to all tracts, and it enjoined Becker from using the Private Road to access his lots from Route 50.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the decision. The Court began its decision by reviewing prior case law decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia governing “private easements.” In Ryder, the Supreme Court of Virginia used the term private easement to describe an easement similar to the Private Road. The Court of Appeals in Becker explained that it was longstanding law that when lands are organized into lots, streets, and alleys, and a plat showing them is recorded, all lots sold and conveyed with reference thereto carry the right to the use of the private easement in those streets necessary to the enjoyment and value of the lots. It specifically looked at the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sipe v. Alley, Ryder, Fugate v. Carter, Walters v. Smith, and Strickland v. Barnes, which all articulated the same principle. In Ryder, the Supreme Court held a private right of easement exists when easements in streets and alleys are created by grant with reference to a map or plat and a grantee is entitled to an easement in streets and alleys adjoining his lot, irrespective of whether the streets conferred a benefit on his lot.
The Court of Appeals held the Private Road here was a “private right of easement,” like the ones upheld in Ryder and its predecessor cases. The Becker lots were created by duly recorded plats in which the Private Road was clearly marked, running on a track coinciding with the easements originally granted by the Rhodeses. The Court distinguished the facts here from cases in which the Supreme Court did not uphold a private easement because, here, the easement was sufficiently described in the relevant deeds, and the purpose and the beneficiaries of the easements were abundantly clear. Lastly, the Court noted that private easements arise by estoppel and are not express easements.
The Kellers also argued that this case did not meet the requirements by the Supreme Court in Lindsay v. James, because here, the Kellers’ deed did not reference a recorded plat in the same subdivision as Becker’s lots. The Court of Appeals found this argument unpersuasive, because the Kellers’ deed stated it was subject to easements, specifically including the Private Street, and Fauquier County’s deed of easement expressly referenced “the private street in this subdivision” (emphasis added). Further, Fauquier County’s deed of easement, which was recorded when the subdivision was created, referenced a plat that identified the Private Road and what became the Kellers’ property. Significantly, the Private Road was also depicted on later recorded surveys referenced in deeds conveying properties in 2009, 2016, and, finally, to the Kellers in 2021. Thus, the Court of Appeals found the record showed that “‘[t]he [Kellers] had full knowledge, actual and constructive, of [Becker’s] claim to a free use and enjoyment of the [Private Road] before they obstructed it.’ Walters, 186 Va. at 173.”
The Court also considered the merger doctrine, which provides that easements may be extinguished if the ownership of the dominant and servient tracts is united in one person. The Court held that the merger doctrine is inapplicable to private easements and the Private Road here. All deeds described the Private Road and stated the conveyances were taken subject to easements, including the Private Road, so the simultaneous ownership of the parcels did not affect the easement.
[1] Figure G on page 8 of the opinion depicts the present-day ownership and parcels.
